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What’s So Special About Patent Law?
Michael Goodman*
The widespread belief that patent law is special has shaped the development of patent law into one of the most specialized areas of the law
today. The belief in patent law’s exceptionalism manifests itself as two
related presumptions with respect to the judiciary: first, that generalist
judges who do not have patent law expertise cannot effectively decide patent cases, and second, that judges can develop necessary expertise
through repeated experience with patent cases. Congress showed that it
acquiesced to both views when it created the Federal Circuit and the Patent Pilot Program. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
reminded us that the judiciary’s difficulty with patent cases is not the
law, but is instead that patent cases often involve difficult subject matter, which sometimes requires technical or scientific expertise. While
Congress’s early attempts to deal with these difficulties focused on courts
with legal―rather than technical―expertise, the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncements suggest that they should have been doing the reverse.
Moreover, to the extent that it is the underlying technology that makes
patent cases difficult, that commends the use of an administrative, rather than a judicial, solution. One potentially viable answer to the judiciary’s problem with patent law has already been partly implemented in
the form of the recently created Patent Trial and Appeal Board. This
Article proposes expansion of that solution by making that new entity the
exclusive forum for deciding issues of patent validity.
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INTRODUCTION
Among legal disciplines, patent law stands a world apart. From
the lawyers who practice patent law―the “patent people”―to the
judges who decide patent disputes, patent law is becoming an increasingly specialized field.1 As any patent person will tell you, and
1

I use the term “patent people” to refer to those attorneys who have earned their
stripes as patent specialists through the act of having spent a significant amount of time
practicing patent law, as opposed to “patent attorneys,” a term applicable only to those
who have passed the patent bar. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
1 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N6TX-PERX] (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). Professor Rai refers to patent people as “patent
insiders.” See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust Ecosystem,
13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 386, 387 (2014).
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most patent outsiders agree, there is just something
unique―something special―about patent law. The belief in patent
law’s exceptionalism manifests itself as two related presumptions
applicable to the judiciary: first, that generalist judges who do not
have patent law expertise cannot effectively decide patent cases,
and second, that judges can develop necessary patent expertise
through experience with patent law.2 Congress showed that it subscribed to both views when it instituted two judicial experiments:
first, when it created the Federal Circuit and mandated that almost
all patent appeals be directed to that entity, and then again when it
created the Patent Pilot Program, through which certain district
court judges would be designated to hear more patent cases.3 The
premises underlying those experiments, and the resulting trend
toward specialization of patent law, have largely been unchallenged, as even outspoken critics of the specialization of courts
have generally agreed that in “complex areas” such as patent law,
it may be useful to have specialized adjudication.4 Recently, however, both the specialization trend and the assumptions upon which
it was based have hit a formidable roadblock: the Supreme Court.
While commentators have described the Federal Circuit as
“the Supreme Court of patent law,”5 it has lately become clear that
the Supreme Court very much intends to remain supreme with respect to patent law as much as any legal discipline. Unlike the other
bodies that deal with patents, the Supreme Court is the one body
that Congress is unable to specialize, and it remains composed entirely of generalist judges. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is significant tension between the highest court and the Federal Circuit. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised the “patent court” for its overly specialized treatment of patent law and
directed that patent law be treated more like other areas of
law. The message from the highest court is clear: patent law is not
so special.6 In sending that message, the Court has also sent a
second, largely unheard missive: in contrast to the widespread view
2

See infra Part I.
See infra Sections I.A., I.B.
4
See infra note 38.
5
See infra Section I.A.
6
See infra Section II.A.
3
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that non-specialist judges cannot effectively conduct patent cases,
the Court’s view is that patent law expertise is not necessary to adjudicate patent appeals.7 Because the Court believes that the law
applicable to patents requires no special expertise, the Court has no
reason to defer to the judgment of judges whose claims to patent
law expertise are based upon repeated exposure to that area of law.
Accordingly, the modern Court no longer affords deference to the
Federal Circuit based upon its purported patent law expertise.
But just because the Supreme Court does not think patent law
is special does not mean the Court does not think there is something special about patent cases. At the same time that the Supreme Court has decried the attempted specialization of patent
law, it has lamented its own and other courts’ general inability to
grasp the nuances of the scientific disciplines that are so often the
subject matter of patent cases. As many jurists have noted previously, what is special about patent cases is not the law, but the
subject matter underlying patent disputes.8
While there have been many previous proposals to deal with
the difficult subject matter involved in patent cases, they generally
run into the same problems the Court has identified with Congress’s previous specialization efforts. Some proposals focus upon
the development of legal―rather than technical―expertise, thereby running up against the Court’s recent declarations about the
lack of need for specialization of that type. Most proposals also involve attempt to specialize the judiciary. As commentators have
long noted, the creation of specialized courts leads to certain problems, perhaps inevitably. Accordingly, proposals to specialize the
patent judiciary suffer from the same concerns applicable to Congress’s efforts to specialize patent law by creating the Federal Circuit and the Patent Pilot Program.
This Article explains why any need for specialization related to
patent cases is best achieved at the administrative level and describes one viable solution that has already been implemented. Unlike Congress’s moves to specialize patent law by specializing the
judiciary, the recent move to specialize patent law by injecting
7
8

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Part III.
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more substantive expertise at the executive agency level will likely
be unobjectionable to the Court. The creation of the Patent and
Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”) and the decision to shift certain issues to that forum, is a form of specialization based upon the
difficult technology underlying patent cases, rather than the law.
This Article suggests expanding that experiment by making the
PTAB the exclusive forum for challenging patent validity. Unlike
Congress’s other specialization efforts, in creating the PTAB,
Congress has produced a specialized body of administrators who
understand the science and technological issues that are often so
difficult for judges to grasp, and has focused that expertise where it
is most needed: issues of patent validity.
Part I of this Article reviews the congressional efforts to specialize the patent judiciary. Part II explores the tension between
those efforts and the Supreme Court, explains why the Supreme
Court will not defer to the “Patent Expert” Federal Circuit, and
addresses the Court’s realization that the difficult portion part of
patent cases is their underlying science and technology. Part III explores previous proposals to inject technical expertise into the judiciary, and why such proposals are unlikely to resolve what ails patent law. Part IV explains why Congress’s creation of the PTAB
fulfills many of the aspirations of earlier proposals to create an expert patent court without suffering from the downsides inherent in
a specialized patent judiciary, and proposes making the PTAB the
exclusive forum for patent validity disputes.
I. THE SPECIALIZATION OF THE PATENT JUDICIARY
Congress’s modern attempts to specialize patent law began, in
1982, at the appellate level with the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a single appellate body to consider all
patent appeals.9 More recently, in 2011, Congress created a Patent
Pilot Program (“PPP”) to specialize patent adjudication at the trial
level.10 This Part describes what led to those developments specifi9

See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
10
See Pilot Program in Certain District Courts, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674
(2011).
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cally while also considering the benefits and costs of judicial specialization more generally.
A. The Federal Circuit
Historically, there was no expectation that judges in any court
either be specialists in a particular area of law or have any particular
subject-matter expertise in the areas in which they judge.11 Rather,
judges in the American system have been selected to be generalists,
and to sit on generalist courts.12 Instead of requiring any expertise
among the judiciary, the federal judges on the ninety-eight U.S.
district courts, the twelve regional courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, were each appointed based largely upon their general
ability as lawyers, and those courts’ jurisdiction defined by geography.13 Those judges were called upon, and assumed to be able, to
decide any area of law.14 In 1961, Judge Henry Friendly sounded a
clarion call for change from that status quo, opining:
[W]hereas it was not unreasonable to expect a judge
to be truly learned in a body of law that Blackstone
compressed into 2400 pages, it is altogether absurd
to expect any single judge to vie with an assemblage
of law professors in the gamut of subjects, ranging
from accounting, administrative law and admiralty
to water rights, wills and world law, that may come
before his court.15

11

See Diane P. Wood, Speech, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU. L.
REV. 1755, 1755–56 (1997).
12
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Current, Subtle—and Not So Subtle—Rejection of an
Independent Judiciary, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 639 (2002) (“Judges are generalists who
deal with a variety of matters and there are very good reasons why they should do so.”);
see generally Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519
(2008).
13
See Cheng, supra note 12, at 522.
14
See John M. Walker, Jr., Comments on Professionalism, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL
ETHICS 111, 113–14 (1999) (“[J]udges should be generalists. Judges should be able to deal
with all kinds of cases as we must do under the federal system. We ought to be able to
handle different cases with equal skill. We ought to have the judgment to discern when
good arguments are being made and when bad arguments are being made.”).
15
Henry Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 220
(1961).
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In an attempt to address the problem he identified, academics began to discuss the costs and benefits of creating specialized
courts.16
There are numerous hypothesized benefits of the specialization
of courts. First, it has been suggested that when a single forum decides all of the cases in a particular area of the law, those decisions
should become more uniform over time, thus creating stability
within that area of the law.17 A second, related, benefit of specialization is increased efficiency. The concept is that by assigning certain cases to a specialized court, the caseloads for judges on other
courts who no longer need to consider those cases will be reduced.18 The third benefit most often cited by advocates of the creation of specialized courts is the development of expertise. Succinctly put, the notion is that judges who sit upon specialized
courts, and who therefore repeatedly deal in the same area of the
law, will become more adept at applying that area of the law.19 The
resulting development of legal expertise, the theory goes, will lead
to both increased efficiency, reflected as more rapid resolution of
cases by the judges on that court, as well as increased accuracy of
the decisions.20 Both the expertise and efficiency benefits of specialization are thought to be especially impactful when the cases considered by a specialized court are complex or time-consuming.21
The critics of judicial specialization, often generalist judges,
have expressed a number of concerns about specialization. Judge
16

Some particularly pertinent works in the vast literature about the costs and benefits
of specialization include: Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58
DUKE L.J. 1667 (2009); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L.
REV. 377 (1990); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745
(1981); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
17
See Paul Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1447
(2012) (reviewing the benefits proposed by others).
18
Baum, supra note 16, at 1675.
19
Id. at 1676.
20
Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1447. Professor Baum describes these benefits as
“efficiency, expertise, and uniformity.” Baum, supra note 16, at 1675. Professor Dreyfuss
categorizes the same benefits into “efficiency reasons” and “administrative reasons.”
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989). Regardless of how they are characterized, the posited benefits
of specialization are largely the same.
21
Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1447.
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Richard Posner warns that specialized courts might not be able to
attract highly qualified judges, that specialist judges might be susceptible to capture by the bar that regularly practices before them,
and that they might be overly sympathetic to the policies furthered
by the law they administer.22 Specifically addressing the potential
creation of a court focused upon patent law, Judge Simon Rifkind
warned that a specialized patent court might lead to tunnel vision—an inability to see the big picture that results in decisions in
conflict with the general body of law—a problem that would prove
to be prophetic.23
Against this backdrop, and weighing those pros and cons, Congress initiated an experiment with a permanent specialized court at
the appellate level and created the Federal Circuit.24 By saying that
the Federal Circuit is a “specialist” or “specialized” court, I mean
simply that the court’s jurisdiction is limited by subject matter,25
and that as a result, the court hears a disproportionate number of a
particular type of case than other courts.26 Federal Circuit Senior
Judge Jay Plager insists that the Federal Circuit is not a specialist
court because the judges on the court hear many different types of
22

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 254
(1996); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3.
23
See Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3 (“Even with the
best motives, a court’s doctrinal isolation may lead to a body of law out of tune with legal
developments elsewhere.”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2001); S. Jay Plager, The United States Court of
Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the
Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 858–59 (1990) (“The concern is that as the
range of cases narrows, the opportunities to see the big picture, or even parts of it, may
narrow as well.”).
24
See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3–4 (reviewing the history of the creation of the
Federal Circuit, including Congress’s motivation to do so and balancing of these
concerns). The D.C. Circuit is also, in part, a specialized court, as that court decides
many specialized areas of administrative law that are not decided by the other regional
courts of appeal.
25
See Cheng, supra note 12, at 526.
26
This understanding of the term “specialized” is not new. See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo,
Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for Internet Law
and Other High Technology Cases, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 n.32 (2002) (“Judges will be
referred to as ‘specialized’ if they have professional or in depth on-the-bench training in a
particular subject matter of cases or controversies (e.g., drug court ‘specialist’ judges),
acquired through significant focused exposure to cases in one area of law.”).
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cases and not solely patent appeals.27 While it is true that the court
considers some additional categories of cases, that only means that
the court is not solely a specialist patent court. There is nothing to
say that one cannot be a specialist in more than one thing. After all,
Leonardo de Vinci was a specialist in both sculpture and mechanics. In the sense I mean, the Federal Circuit is a specialist patent
court as well as a specialist in veterans law, government personnel,
and federal contract law.28
Of the subject areas that the Federal Circuit considers, patent
law was the subject matter Congress had in mind when it conceived
the court, and the promise that a specialized court would result in
patent law becoming more uniform was the primary impetus for its
creation.29 At the time, patent law was suffering from a fragmentation problem that specialization was thought to rectify.30 Before the
Federal Circuit’s creation, a different version of patent law applied
depending upon which circuit a litigant was in, with the result that
forum shopping was rampant and inventors could not predict
whether their patents would be enforced or struck down as
invalid.31 The creation of a single, specialized court was intended to
stabilize the law and make it uniform across the country.32 As the
first Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, Howard Markey, explained: “The challenge to the court and its bar is to create and
27

See S. Jay Plager, The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 751, 754 (2007); S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735
(2007). Judge Plager also notes that a court could be considered specialized if the
“background and training of the judges who make up the court” were uniform, a
condition he points out is not met for the Federal Circuit. Plager, supra, at 754. Judge
Plager is correct that there is nothing specialized about the judges’ backgrounds. See infra
note 48 and accompanying text.
28
See Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1461–62 (describing the other aspects of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction).
29
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (“[T]he central purpose is to reduce the
widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the
administration of patent law.”); see also Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744
F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“It is, therefore, clear that one of the primary objectives
of our enabling legislation is to bring about uniformity in the area of patent law.”).
30
See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 6–7.
31
See id.
32
See id.; see also Plager, supra note 23, at 854–55 (“The impetus behind the
establishment of the Federal Circuit was the desire to bring about greater uniformity and
coherency in federal decisional law in the areas assigned to the court.”).
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maintain a uniform, reliable, predictable, nationally-applicable body
of law.”33
There were also some secondary considerations. For example,
many have noted that the court was charged with strengthening
patent law, or at least being sympathetic to the policies underlying
the patent system.34 In addition, as noted by proponents of specialization, the creation of a single court to consider patent appeals
would remove any tendency of litigants to forum-shop, a problem
that was perceived as particularly egregious in patent cases because
of differences in the law in the different circuits.35 Putting patent
cases in a separate court would also solve another problem Congress wanted to address. Patent cases were thought to be particularly time-consuming for the regional appellate courts, and Congress was trying to find a way to reduce the caseloads for those
courts.36 To combat the potential dangers of specialization, especially the problem of capture by a specialized bar, Congress gave
the court jurisdiction over a number of other types of subject matter in addition to patent law.37 While there was not, and indeed still
33

Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Challenge and
Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595 (1985); see also Paul Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a
Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1798 (2013) (“Congress gave the Federal
Circuit a clear mandate to bring uniformity to patent law. . . . ”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97312, at 20–23; S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5–6 (19810).
34
See, e.g., Paul Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.
350 (2014); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law,
1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2224 (2000) (“[T]he creation of the Federal Circuit
had a clear substantive agenda: to strengthen patents.”). Some see this as a weakness of
the court. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
761, 785 (1983) (“Specialists are more likely than generalists to identify with the goals of a
government program, since the program is the focus of their career. They may therefore
see their function as one of enforcing the law in a vigorous rather than a tempered fashion.
In this respect the case for a generalist federal judiciary resembles the case for the jury not
despite, but because of, its lack of expertness.”).
35
See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 840 (2002)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“At that appellate level, Congress sought to eliminate forum
shopping and to advance uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent
law.”); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 378.
36
See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 2.
37
See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for A Specialized Patent
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 410 (2011). For a discussion of the other areas
within the court’s jurisdiction, see generally Gugliuzza, supra note 17.

2016]

WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT PATENT LAW?

807

is not, agreement that specialization of courts is ever an ideal arrangement, there is widespread agreement that whatever benefits
there are to a specialized court are especially pronounced in “complex areas” such as patent law.38 As nearly everyone seems to agree
that patent cases are both time-consuming and complex, patent law
was thus considered an appropriate, perhaps even ideal, subject
matter for an experiment in specialization.39
Another consideration in the creation of the Federal Circuit,
and the one in which this Article is most interested, is that Congress believed it was creating a court with particular expertise.40 As
Judge Markey colorfully suggested to Congress during hearings
about the creation of the Federal Circuit: “[I]f I am doing brain
surgery every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that I
will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a number of them, than
someone who does brain surgery once every couple of years.”41

38

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
109, 115 (1997) (“Especially in highly complex areas, a specialized court allows
recruitment of judges who have specific background in the field and permits individuals
on the bench to develop expertise.”); Sarang Vijay Damle, Specialize the Judge, Not the
Court: A Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2005) (“[A]
specialist judiciary will enhance the quality of decisions, especially in complex areas of the
law.”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 401 (“A specialized court that allows judges to
develop expertise—or judicial human capital—may thus be warranted for some complex
areas of law.”); Revesz, supra note 16, at 1118 n.32 (“[C]ertain areas are so complex that
it is inefficient for a generalist judge to learn about them.”).
39
See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 28
(2014) (“With complex scientific concepts and difficult code-like lingo, patent law is a
territory in which few generalists dare to tread . . . .”); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at
67 (“[B]oth patent law and the facts to which the law applies are technically abstruse.”);
Sue Ann Ganske, The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Six Patent Cases in 2014, Culminating in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 183, 201 (2015)
(describing patent law as a “complex area of law”); Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 401
(“[P]atent cases are generally considered to be complex.”); Darrell Issa, Why I’m Pushing
for the Patent Pilot Program, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.law360.com/
articles/17234/why-i-m-pushing-for-the-patent-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/5KGECXTG] (“[P]atent law is absolutely one of the most complex areas of law.”).
40
See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 198 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16
(describing the court as providing “expertise in highly specialized and technical areas.”)
(quoting statement of J. Jon O. Newman).
41
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981)
(statement of the Hon. Howard T. Markey, C.J., Court of Customs and Patent Appeals);
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Specialization of courts is not, of course, the same thing as specialization of judges, and one can imagine systems of centralized adjudication that do not involve specialist judges.42 The doctrinal stability and uniformity goals underlying the creation of a specialized
court could be accomplished by the mere fact that the decisions are
made by a single group of judges, regardless of whether those
judges have developed any particular subject-matter expertise.
Thus, for the Federal Circuit’s patent cases, Judge Friendly’s notion of specialization of labor could be achieved regardless of
whether the individuals on the court are “patent specialists.” Indeed, in an early assessment of whether the Federal Circuit
achieved Congress’s goals, Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss recognized
that “the benefits of specialization appear to lie primarily in giving
the court the right mix of cases, not in giving the cases the right
kind of judges.”43 As Daniel Meador has noted, the primary purpose of the creation of the Federal Circuit was “not to create a
court of experts or specialists,”44 and as Senior Judge Plager wrote,
“[I]t does not follow that if a court specializes in one or more areas
of the law, the judges appointed to the court should be specialists in
those areas.”45
Nonetheless, commentators routinely acquiesce in the notion
that one of the primary benefits of specialization of the Federal
Circuit is the development of patent expertise in the judges that sit
upon that court, especially as contrasted with the regional appellate
courts, which are thought unable to “generate accuracy because no
single court heard enough patent cases to allow (or motivate) its
judges to develop the kind of expertise required to develop a sophisticated body of law.”46 In 2008, Professor Dreyfuss explicitly
see also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1836 (“[A]nother reason Congress created the
Federal Circuit was to provide expert adjudication in complex patent cases.”).
42
See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989) (proposing a rotating
panel concept in which generalist judges would rotate through panels that hear only a
specific subject matter over time).
43
Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 24.
44
Meador, supra note 42, at 611–12.
45
Plager, supra note 23, at 858.
46
Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 66; see also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1836 (“[A]nother
reason Congress created the Federal Circuit was to provide expert adjudication in
complex patent cases.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L.
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called for the Federal Circuit to “press its position as a tribunal
with special expertise and to fulfill its role as the near-final authority in patent matters.”47 It is critical to recognize that the perception that the Federal Circuit is an expert tribunal derives from the
notion that the judges develop “expertise” with respect to their
patent docket only by virtue of having heard and decided a lot of
patent cases; for the most part, the Federal Circuit judges do not
have scientific or technical backgrounds.48 Just like when Congress
created the Federal Circuit, the prevailing notion is that simply
hearing more of a particular type of case makes a judge an “expert.”49 In the case of the Federal Circuit, there appears to be a
virtual consensus among commentators that they are patent experts by virtue of hearing so many patent cases.50 It is therefore not
REV. 67 (1995) (advocating the use of specialized courts to consider issues “over which a
generalist bench is unlikely to achieve sufficient expertise and efficiency under its normal
caseload”).
47
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008).
48
Only seven out of the first thirty-four judges to sit on the Federal Circuit had
technical backgrounds. See Dunstan H. Barnes, Technically Speaking, Does it Matter? An
Empirical Study Linking the Federal Circuit Judges’ Technical Backgrounds to How They
Analyze the Section 112 Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 88 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 971 (2013). Of the most recent appointments since that publication, Judges
Raymond Chen and Kara Stoll have technical backgrounds, while Judges Richard Taranto
and Todd Hughes do not, making for a total of nine out of thirty-eight, or less than onefourth of the judges who have ever sat upon the Federal Circuit with technical
backgrounds. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts
.gov/judges [https://perma.cc/VK2E-TJT6] (last visited Feb. 13, 2016). Also, contrary
to persistent misconceptions about the Federal Circuit, it is not the case that only Federal
Circuit judges with significant patent experience consider patent cases. See, e.g., Ben
Klemens, The Rise of the Information Processing Patent, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 16
(2008) (“Only a few judges on the [Federal Circuit] bench hear patent cases, and as is
natural, most of those are former prominent patent attorneys.”). In fact, all of the court’s
judges are randomly assigned cases from the court’s docket.
49
See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 198 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16.
50
See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases,
59 DUKE L.J. 1501, 1538 (2010) (“Whether or not judges on a specialized court have prior
experience in the field of their court’s work, they become specialists once they begin their
judicial service.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004) (“[S]pecialization
can foster expertise, leading to more accurate and efficient decisionmaking.”) [hereinafter
Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment]; William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law,
14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2006) (“Specialized courts allow judges to gain experience and
therefore develop expertise.”); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS
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surprising that in Congress’s next step toward specializing patent
law, Congress specifically moved to specialize not the courts, but
the judges themselves, this time at the district court level.51
B. The Patent Pilot Program
After the Federal Circuit’s creation, commentators began to
complain about the high rate at which that court was reversing patent decisions of the federal district courts, particularly reversals of
the meaning of terms in patent claims, known as claim construction.52 In a series of studies, researchers had demonstrated persistently high reversal rates of nearly a third of cases.53 To many, that
reversal rate was unacceptable, and demonstrated a need to fix
L. REV. 1547, 1549 (2011) (“Because about one-third of the Federal Circuit’s docket is
comprised of patent-related cases, the judges of the court have developed broad expertise
in patent law.”); Daniel J. Meador, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: An Appellate Court
Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
471, 482 (1983) (arguing that specialization “improves decision making because each
judge can achieve a higher level of expertise on the subjects with which he is regularly
dealing”); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court with a Specialization in
Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 766, 788 (2000) (“Clearly, the
Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a higher average level than that
previously found in the regional circuits, as a result to deciding over 200 patent appeals
per year.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional
Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 121 (2014) (“[J]udges in those courts are presumably
experts and can be counted on to apply and develop the law more coherently on a
particular topic.”). Indeed, the notion that the Federal Circuit judges are experts in
patent law is so widespread that Professor Bock has described the Federal Circuit as
suffering from “the curse of expertise.” Jeremy W. Bock, Restructuring the Federal
Circuit, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 197, 204 (2014). It has also been noted that
“the court also has a very firm belief in its own expertise.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 327, 342 (2014) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive
Jurisdiction]. The court’s view of itself as an expert patent court is well demonstrated by
Midwest v. Karavan. See Midwest Indus. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 61 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e think that as the sole appellate exponent of patent law principles this
court should play a leading role in fashioning the rules specifying what patent law does
and does not foreclose by way of other legal remedies.”).
51
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
52
See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases, 12
FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 32 (2002); see generally J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal
Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the history of claim construction).
53
See Anderson & Menell, supra note 52, at 33 (collecting and analyzing the empirical
studies of claim construction reversal rates).
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what was thought to be a broken system.54 Commentators began to
question whether the trial court judges, who often do not have
much experience with patent cases, could successfully perform
claim construction as they manage the few patent cases assigned to
them.55 The general view is probably well captured by Professor
Dreyfuss’s assertion that “[a] trial judge who has never read a
technical document before is less likely to interpret it correctly, no
matter how many expert witnesses are called to testify, than an appellate judge who has extensive experience in dealing with such
matters.”56 The prevailing dogma was that district court judges
could not effectively handle patent cases.57
Among those asserting that district court judges lacked the ability to decide issues of patent law is former Federal Circuit Judge
Richard Linn, who proposed, as a solution to district court judges’
allegedly poor performance, that the Federal Circuit might sponsor
“judicial training programs, hosting judicial seminars, or facilitating the exchange of effective practices in patent cases among trial
judges.”58 But as some commentators, including then-professor,
now-Federal Circuit judge, Moore suggested, if patent law expertise is acquired by lots of experience, “it seems unlikely that district court judges will have sufficient exposure to patent cases . . .
to improve at construing patent claim terms.”59 Accordingly, those
who believe that experience deciding patent cases will improve the
54

See id. at 33–34 (collecting and describing those viewpoints). But see Jeffrey A.
Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2007) (asserting that claim construction reversal rates were
not substantially higher than reversal rates in other complex litigation).
55
See Moore, supra note 52, at 19 (“[T]he frequency with which the Federal Circuit
judges are construing claims suggests that these judges are developing expertise at the
task that will increase their ability to perform it accurately. While individual district court
judges construe only a handful of patent claim terms, the Federal Circuit judges perform
this task with great frequency.”).
56
Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 48.
57
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 934 (2001); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at
805.
58
Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit Now that It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2004).
59
Moore, supra note 52, at 30; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“U.S. federal
district judges on average have insufficient exposure to patent litigation to develop
expertise in patent law and patent litigation.”).
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performance of district court judges have generally suggested the
creation of a specialized patent trial court.60 Advocates of the specialization of courts have noted that the purported benefits to patent law resulting from increased expertise at the Federal Circuit
would be even greater at the trial court level, asserting that
“[d]espite the creation of a specialized appellate court and the concomitant benefits to patent adjudication, there is reason to believe
that the complexity of patent litigation justifies specialization at the
trial court level as well.”61
Responsive to these suggestions and in an effort to increase the
expertise of the judges who decide patent cases at the trial level,
Congress created the PPP62 with the express purpose of “the creation of a patent specialists’ pilot program at the U.S. district court
level, which is intended to improve the adjudication of patent disputes.”63 As Congressman Darrell Issa―who first proposed the
PPP―opined, “[N]ot all judges have the interest or expertise to
handle complex patent litigation.”64 The goal, therefore, is to divert patent cases to those judges who express an interest in patent
law, in the hopes that those judges will thereby develop patent law
expertise as a result.65 By adopting the PPP, Congress acquiesced
in the perceptions that (1) deciding more patent cases will lead to
patent law expertise, and (2) that expertise will lead to different,
presumptively better, outcomes.66
60

See Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent Trial
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of
Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 169, 172 (2009); Moore, supra note 57,
at 932 (“[A] specialized tribunal would develop expertise in patent law and the resolution
of patent cases, increasing its accuracy and efficiency at resolving these cases.”); John B.
Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade Be Given Patent Jurisdiction
Concurrent with That of the District Courts?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 71–72 (1995); Arti K.
Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1035 (2003); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating
Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 877, 877 (2002) [hereinafter Rai, Specialized
Trial Courts].
61
Kesan & Ball, supra note 37, at 414; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 767.
62
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
63
H.R. REP. NO. 109-673, at 3 (2006).
64
Issa, supra note 39.
65
Id.
66
See Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 50, at 329 (“[T]he judges
participating in the [patent pilot] program will likely develop special expertise in local
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The view that non-specialist judges cannot effectively conduct
patent cases continues to be widespread. In 2010, Professor Dreyfuss maintained that the Federal Circuit, due to its having developed patent law expertise, has a comparative advantage with respect to understanding the facts in patent cases versus both other
courts of appeals and trial judges.67 With respect to trial judges, she
asserts that “most trial judges have very little experience in hightech cases and some are very uncomfortable with technological
complexity. But the Federal Circuit does not have that problem.”68
In another recent article that explores the tension between law and
science, Peter Lee begins with the premise that generalist judges
“lack the capacity to administer” patent law.69 That view also extends to the generalist judges who sit on the Supreme Court. As
John Golden has opined, comparing the Supreme Court to the
Federal Circuit: “The Supreme Court lacks such expertise and has
typically demonstrated little in the way of generalist legal craft that
can add significant value to the resolution of such substantive questions.”70 In short, the bulk of the commentary related to patent
law, mostly written by “patent people,” continues to assert that
“patent people” make better patent law judges.71 As explored in
the next Section, the Supreme Court has not taken kindly to that
viewpoint.

technologies and gain unique perspectives on the problems these industries encounter.”);
Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent Pilot Program’s
Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 191, 194 (2009)
(“Judges that are more familiar with patent law will theoretically make better decisions
that hold up on appeal to the Federal Circuit.”); Nancy Olson, Comment, Does Practice
Make Perfect? An Examination of Congress’s Proposed District Court Patent Pilot Program, 55
UCLA L. REV. 745, 751, 762–71 (2008); Issa, supra note 39.
67
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme
Court and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 797 (2010).
68
Id.
69
Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2010) (noting that his
article “proceeds on the premise that no matter how elegantly policymakers craft patent
law, if generalist judges lack the capacity to administer it, the patent system cannot fulfill
its objectives”).
70
John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 660 (2009); see also
Lee, supra note 69, at 73 (“[S]keptics might doubt the technical competence of the
Supreme Court to fully grapple with patent doctrine.”).
71
See Golden, supra note 70, at 660.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S RE-ENTRY INTO PATENT LAW
After the creation of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
largely left that court to its own devices,72 an inattention that led to
the Federal Circuit being referred to as “the de facto supreme
court of patents.”73 During the decade from 1992–2002, the Court
began to hear a few more patent cases, primarily those involving
“procedural, jurisdictional, and structural issues rather than substantive patent law.”74 The relationship between the Federal Circuit
and Supreme Court was such that Mark Janis suggested, “Neither
the time, temperament, nor resources of the Supreme Court will
allow for the implementation of an interventionist approach to patent decision making.”75 John Duffy described the sporadic attention given by the Supreme Court to patent law during that time period as “a sign not of the Federal Circuit’s failure as a specialized
court, but of its great success.”76 The general view of commentators at the time is well expressed by LeRoy Kondo, who wrote in
2002 that “[o]ver the past quarter century, the U.S. Supreme
Court has implicitly given the Federal Circuit its ‘vote of confidence’ in resolving complex technological issues by rarely granting
certiorari to hear patent or trademark cases.”77
Since 2002, the Court has taken a more active interest in patent
law. No longer focusing solely upon procedural issues, the Court
began “to dive into the heart of patent law,” as it considered issues
“related to the core aspects of patent law.”78 The Court’s interest
in patent law appears to have peaked, so far, during the 2013–2014

72

See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 277 (2002) (describing the history of the Supreme
Court’s review of Federal Circuit decisions).
73
Janis, supra note 23, at 387.
74
Lee, supra note 69, at 43; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 6 (2003) (“[M]any of the patent cases taken by the Supreme Court are ‘patent cases’
only in the sense that they involve a patent; rarely do they involve substantive patent
law.”).
75
Janis, supra note 23, at 395.
76
Duffy, supra note 72, at 284.
77
Kondo, supra note 26, at 18.
78
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2, 25 (2007).
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term, when it issued decisions in six patent cases, the most issued
in a single term since the creation of the Federal Circuit.79
This return of the Supreme Court to patent law has garnered
considerable attention, with few describing the courts’ recent relationship as cheerfully today as commentators did a decade ago.80 In
contrast to the Court’s early foray into patent law, the Court’s recent decisions reflect apparent frustration with the Federal Circuit.
Some have described the Court’s treatment of the Federal Circuit
as “disdainful,”81 whereas even those more hopeful about the two
courts’ relationship consider the treatment “somewhat bewildering.”82 In addition to reviewing an increasing number of patent
cases, the Court has also nearly consistently reversed the Federal
Circuit, and has almost always done so unanimously.83 It is fair to
say that the Supreme Court has recently issued a “startlingly
strong rebuke of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.”84
Why the Court has so aggressively stepped in to overturn the
Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence is the subject of much
79

See Kevin R. Casey & Kevin B. Anderson, The Supreme Court’s Six-Pack of Cases, 27
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9, 9 (2015).
80
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation
and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007); Lucas S.
Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 419 (2012).
81
Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme
Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 204–05 (2009).
But see Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 793 (“[H]eightened review should not be taken as a
criticism of the Federal Circuit.”).
82
Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 808; see also Plager, supra note 27, at 757
(“[C]uriously . . . the Supreme Court in several other recent cases has inserted itself into
the operational aspects of patent law.”).
83
See Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 792 (noting that the Supreme Court “has reversed,
vacated, or questioned nearly every” Federal Circuit decision it has reviewed); Gary M.
Hoffman & Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases—
Placing the Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determining If It Will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J.
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227 (2010) (“[N]early every Federal Circuit patent
case to reach the Supreme Court in the past decade has been reversed or vacated in some
form.”).
84
Feldman, supra note 39, at 31. But see Hoffman & Kinder, supra note 83, at 229
(asserting that the Court’s recent involvement in patent policy is “relatively minor when
compared to other eras of Supreme Court review”). According to those commentators, in
the grand scheme of things, the Court’s “true objective may be a slight adjustment by the
high Court, consistent with and reminiscent of philosophies past.” Hoffman & Kinder,
supra note 83, at 228.
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scholarly discussion.85 For some, it looks like the gist of what the
Court is doing is attempting to reduce patent rights.86 While the
Federal Circuit is largely seen as being a pro-patentee court, the
Supreme Court’s involvement has been described as an attempt to
level the playing field, and especially to combat the perceived problem created by so-called “patent trolls,” firms that assert patent
rights but do not produce any goods or services themselves.87 For
others, the explanation for the Court’s recent foray into patent law
is that the Court has been “systematically favoring holistic standards over formalistic, bright-line rules,”88 a shift that has been
criticized by some,89 and praised by others.90 Yet another interpretation is that the Court’s patent decisions are an admonition of the
Federal Circuit’s decision-making process generally and “are messages about coming into the fold of careful and precise legal decision-making.”91 Thus, one proposed solution to the Federal Circuit’s Supreme Court dilemma is more careful drafting of its legal
decisions.92
While I agree that the Court is admonishing the Federal Circuit’s decision-making, I believe the explanation for why is more
85

See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 793 (“[O]ne really must wonder about this level
of activity and whether it is an implicit criticism of the Federal Circuit’s work.”).
86
See Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, 94-FEB A.B.A. J. 58, 60 (2008); see
also Lee, supra note 69, at 46 (“[T]he Court’s recent interventions have clearly operated
to narrow substantive patent rights.”).
87
See, e.g., Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Munio, Restoring the Balance: The Supreme
Court Joins the Patent Reform Movement, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 15 (2008) (“The Supreme
Court is endeavoring to re-balance a patent system that the Court may regard as too
favorable to patent applicants and owners.”).
88
Lee, supra note 69, at 46. Professor Lee’s suggestion that the Court prefers
standards over rules has been called into question. See Feldman, supra note 39, at 29
(“[S]uggesting that the current Supreme Court has a preference for balancing tests and
flexible standards would be somewhat surprising on its face . . . . Nor does the notion of a
preference for standards over rules fit consistently with decisions over the last few
years.”). It is also the opposite of Timothy Holbrook’s earlier suggestion that the Court’s
involvement in patent law in 2000–2002 reflected the Court’s enabling of the Federal
Circuit’s shift toward bright-line rules. See Holbrook, supra note 74, at 5.
89
See Holbrook, supra note 74, at 5.
90
See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Formalism and Anti-Formalism in Patent Law Adjudication:
Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 427 (2013).
91
Feldman, supra note 39, at 29.
92
See Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment, supra note 50, at 809 (“[T]he Court does not
defer because the Federal Circuit’s opinions are not very persuasive.”).
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substantive than that the Federal Circuit has poorly written decisions. Instead, it appears that the Court is sending two distinct, but
related, messages: first, that patent law is not that special, and
second that understanding patent law does not require patent law
expertise. Because the kind of “expertise” the Federal Circuit
judges have is simply knowledge of patent law, and the Court does
not believe that such expertise makes one better able to decide patent law cases, the Court has concluded that the Federal Circuit is
owed no special deference on patent law issues. By disagreeing
with the commentators that only judges with patent experience can
properly apply patent laws, the Supreme Court has called into
question one of the reasons Congress created the Federal Circuit
and the entire reason for the creation of the PPP.
A. Patent Law Is Not Special
Over its short history, the Federal Circuit has created various
special rules applicable to patents based upon the notion that patent law should somehow be different than other law, thus validating Judge Rifkind’s prediction that a specialized patent court would
lead to decisions in conflict with the general body of law.93 The Supreme Court’s intervention has resulted in a systematic undoing of
that jurisprudence, as the Court maintains that the law applicable
to patents is no different than the law applicable to other topics.
The first message underlying the Supreme Court’s intervention is
straightforward: patent law is not that special.
The Court’s realignment of patent law with the rest of the legal
world can probably be traced back to procedural decisions the
Court issued in 1999 and 2002. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court
held that the Federal Circuit must review the Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) factfinding under the standards set out by
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), just like every other
agency.94 In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the argument
93

See Rifkind, supra note 23, at 425; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 3 (“Even with
the best motives, a court’s doctrinal isolation may lead to a body of law out of tune with
legal developments elsewhere.”); Janis, supra note 23, at 396–97. For an interesting
analysis of how the Federal Circuit’s insularism was a predictable result of its
specialization, see Alan B. Parker, Examining Distinctive Jurisprudence in the Federal
Circuit: Consequences of a Specialized Court, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 269 (2009).
94
See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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that the Federal Circuit’s review of patent law is special, and outside the boundary of the generally applicable APA.95 In Holmes
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the Court held
that the Federal Circuit should not have jurisdiction over a case in
which the complaint does not raise a patent claim, but one is raised
as a counterclaim.96 To reach that decision, the Court was again
forced to explicitly deal with the argument that Congress’s intention to create uniformity within patent law trumps general principles of law.97 In holding, instead, that the well-pleaded complaint
rule applies to control the Federal Circuit just as it does other
courts, the Court again rejected the notion that the Federal Circuit
and patent law are special.98
The Court again undid a Federal Circuit rule based upon the
notion that patent law is special in its 2006 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC decision.99 Whereas the Federal Circuit had established a “general rule”—unique to patent cases—“that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudicated,”100 the Supreme Court held in eBay, instead, that the
traditional four-factor test for determining whether to issue a permanent injunction applies “with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”101 The next year, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Court struck down the Federal Circuit rule that “a
patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an Article III case
or controversy with regard to the patent’s validity, enforceability,
or scope” as inconsistent with the Court’s jurisprudence concerning application of the Declaratory Judgment Act generally.102 The
Court completed that re-alignment of patent law with the Declaratory Judgment Act in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures,
LLC, when it rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the

95

See id. at 163.
See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
97
See id. at 832.
98
See id. at 832–33.
99
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
100
See id. at 393–94 (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
101
Id. at 391.
102
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122 (2007).
96
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burden of proving infringement is born by a declaratory judgment
plaintiff, rather than the patentee.103
The Court next demonstrated that patent law is not special by
rejecting the Federal Circuit’s exceptional case standards. First, in
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining when a patent case is exceptional, holding that the standard should be the
same as it is in copyright cases.104 At the same time, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that entitlement to attorney
fees must be established by clear and convincing evidence, holding
instead that, like other “comparable fee-shifting statutes,” the correct standard is preponderance of the evidence.105 In Highmark Inc.
v. Allcare Health Management System, the Court completed its reversal of the Federal Circuit’s “exceptional case” precedent, holding that, just like fee-shifting statutes outside the patent context,
the district court’s exceptional case decisions in the patent context
must also be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.106
Similarly, in Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Systems, Inc., the Court
drew from contract law, property law, and criminal law to reach its
conclusion that a belief in a patent’s invalidity is no defense to a
charge of inducing patent infringement.107 The Court again drew
on broadly applicable legal principles in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. when it held that the Federal Circuit must review a district court’s claim construction under the clear error
standard rather than conducting its own analysis de novo.108 The
explicit basis for that holding is that Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applies just as much to fact findings in patent cases as in any other type of dispute.109 The Court further
demonstrated that patent law is not as special as the Federal Circuit seemed to think when reviewing a case out of Texas in Gunn v.
Minton, when it rejected the reasoning of a line of an entire line of
103

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014).
See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
105
See id. at 1758.
106
See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747–48 (2014).
107
See Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015).
108
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
109
See id. at 836.
104
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Federal Circuit precedent holding that state law claims alleging legal malpractice in the handling of a patent case must be brought in
federal court because they raise “a substantial federal issue.”110
The message from the Court is that patent law is no different
than other areas of the law. The message, it seems, has started to
get out, at least to the direct recipients of the Court’s message: the
Federal Circuit judges themselves. As Judge O’Malley recently
recognized, the Supreme Court’s message to the Federal Circuit is
that “as an Article III court, it is bound by the same civil rules, jurisdictional standards, and common law principles that govern all
Article III courts—in other words, that patent litigation must be
treated like all other litigation.”111 In contrast, the Court’s next
message, which follows directly from the notion that patent law is
not special, has not been widely recognized.
B. The Supreme Court Does Not Defer to Federal Circuit Expertise
The Supreme Court’s attention to patent law beyond the procedural and into “the heart of patent law”112 has “caused consternation in patent circles.”113 Professor Dreyfuss captures perfectly
what appears to be the prevailing sentiment among patent people:
The judges on the Federal Circuit have built up experience over their years of service, while the Justices of the Supreme Court do not even have a generalist’s knowledge of patent law. After all, their own
experience on lower court benches could not possibly have given them any perspective on patent
law . . . .114
To Professor Dreyfuss, the problem is “how the Supreme
Court can use the generalist knowledge derived from its unique po110

See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063, 1068 (2013) (“Nor can we accept the
suggestion that the federal courts’ greater familiarity with patent law means that legal
malpractice cases like this one belong in federal court.”).
111
See Kathleen M. O’Malley, The Intensifying National Interest in Patent Litigation, 19
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 10 (2015); see also Plager, supra note 27, at 751 (“One type of
case that draws Supreme Court attention is one in which the Circuit strays from generally
applicable rules governing litigation in favor of special rules for patent cases.”).
112
Holbrook, supra note 78, at 25.
113
Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 807.
114
Id. at 794.
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sition in a way that takes account of the Federal Circuit’s expertise
in technology, patents, and licensing.”115 She has suggested that
the Supreme Court’s attention is not a criticism of the Federal Circuit and that the Court must “figure out how a judiciary largely
committed to generalist adjudication should deal with a court that
is so differently constituted.”116 Suggesting that it is yet to be determined “under what circumstances a specialized court should be
able to ‘pull rank’ and claim that its expertise gives it a superior
perspective,”117 Professor Dreyfuss asserts that “[w]hat the Supreme Court has not done . . . is face the larger question of expertise head-on.”118
I disagree. The Court has addressed the patent law expertise
question; it has just reached a conclusion that patent people do not
like. The analysis can be summarized as follows: first, because patent law is not that difficult or special, understanding and interpreting it does not require any particular legal expertise. Furthermore,
because interpreting patent law does not require any particular legal expertise, those judges who have become “specialists” by developing expertise through exposure to patent law should not be
given special deference as an “expert” court. Accordingly, the legal opinions of the Federal Circuit judges are no longer entitled to
special treatment or deference as an “expert” court. These messages from the Court—that patent law does not require legal expertise and that therefore patent law expertise is not entitled to deference—although intimately related to the first message described
above, has not yet been digested by the patent community at
large.119
115

Id. at 796.
Id. at 794.
117
Id. at 807.
118
Id. at 799.
119
The Federal Circuit judges also appear not to see a pattern in the Court’s
pronouncements, instead suggesting that it is related to the importance of patent law to
the nation. See, e.g., Plager, supra note 27, at 757 (“[C]uriously, though in keeping with
the notion that patent law now plays a major economic role in the nation, the Supreme
Court in several other recent cases has inserted itself into the operational aspects of
patent law.”). Still, while patent people generally appear not to appreciate this
implication of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is not unappreciated by some
practitioners. See, e.g., Jeff Bleich & Josh Patashnik, Supreme Court Watch: The Federal
Circuit Under Fire, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall 2014, at 42 (“Specialists see patent law as a field that
116
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As already noted, for many years after the Federal Circuit’s
creation, the Supreme Court implicitly gave the Federal Circuit its
“vote of confidence” in resolving patent cases.120 Indeed, during
that period, the Supreme Court was also known to explicitly describe the Federal Circuit as specialists in patent law.121 Even while
the Court required the Federal Circuit to defer more than it had to
the PTO in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court also took pains to note
that the Federal Circuit was itself “a specialized court” that would
review PTO factfinding “through the lens of patent-related experience.”122 That perspective was not to last. If the Court’s early
lack of attention was a vote of confidence, its attentiveness in recent years suggests the opposite. Even had the Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit in the twenty-five patent cases it has taken in the
last decade, the excessive attention would still suggest that the
Court has concerns about permitting the Federal Circuit to be the
final word on patent law issues.
The Court laid the foundation for why the “expert” Federal
Circuit need not be given deference when the modern Court took
its first substantive look at patent law in 2002 in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.123 As Professor Duffy documented, the Supreme Court quickly recognized that “while the
application of the law to the facts of any particular patent case is
difficult, the law being applied need not be.”124 Professor Duffy’s
analysis is spot on and worth repeating:
For a generalist Court such as the Supreme
Court, one immediate problem presented by patent
transcends traditional law; it requires a carefully trained eye, to know what is indeed an
invention and what is not, and rules that give a heightened degree of protection to
encourage inventors to keep inventing. Generalists have little sympathy for these
attitudes. For them, patent cases require no more special knowledge than any other
difficult and high-stakes area—from antitrust to copyright to employment to consumer
class actions—where generalist judges are perfectly capable of resolving highly complex
and nuanced questions of law.”).
120
Kondo, supra note 26, at 18.
121
Cf. Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (“[W]e lack the
benefit of the Federal Circuit’s informed opinion on the complex issue of the degree to
which the obviousness determination is one of fact.”).
122
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999).
123
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
124
Duffy, supra note 72, at 331.
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cases is that they are likely to involve a great amount
of technological detail that the Court is ill-suited to
evaluate . . . .
....
The Supreme Court overcame this problem
with an elegant solution. It simply asserted that “the
precise details of the [invention’s] operation are not
essential here.” Here we see a wise precedent for
the Court’s involvement in patent cases, and perhaps too in other cases requiring specialized knowledge. The insight is that, while the application of
the law to the facts of any particular patent case is
difficult, the law being applied need not be. . . . The
arguments made before the Court—which concerned the unfairness of a retroactive decision, the
need for stability in property rights, the aspiration
for precise definitions of property rights, and the
practical limits of language—do not require any particular knowledge of technology. A generalist Court
can comprehend these matters; indeed, it may have
a broader perspective on them than does a court
immersed in the details of a specialized field of
law.125
The Supreme Court was unanimous in Festo when it concluded
that the en banc Federal Circuit had “ignored the guidance” of the
Supreme Court.126 Even though it is itself a generalist court, the
Supreme Court decided that the Federal Circuit had erred in applying substantive patent law and that it did not take a patent law
expert to see it.127 It is notable that the Court has continued to express near unanimity when overturning the Federal Circuit’s patent decisions.128 In a time when the Supreme Court is sharply divided in other areas of the law, the fact that the Justices see eye-toeye when holding that the Federal Circuit is wrong speaks volumes
about the Court’s lack of confidence in that court’s expertise.
125
126
127
128

Id. at 329–32 (internal citations omitted).
See Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.
See id.
See id. at 725.
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The Court has continued—and expanded upon—this line of
thinking from Festo to today. In 2006, the Court granted certiorari
in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc., a case involving 35 U.S.C. § 101, patentable subject matter.129
While the Court ultimately dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the denial and in the process called into question the
Federal Circuit’s handling of patent law as well as the premise that
a generalist court could not do as well: “[A] decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate,
among both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent
system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects
the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’”130 Those Justices left no doubt that they were affirming
the position avowed in Festo: that generalists can interpret the patent laws as well as specialists.131
Were there any doubt remaining about the Court’s belief that it
can wade into substantive patent law headfirst, that doubt was disposed of the following year when the Court addressed the law of
obviousness in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.132 In KSR, the
Court did not accuse the Federal Circuit of failing to apply generally applicable rules of law to patent law, but instead of failing to understand patent law itself.133 After explaining that “[t]he flaws in
the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the most part to the
court’s narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry,”134 the
Court went on to detail the Federal Circuit’s errors related both to
how patent examiners should assess obviousness and how a “person of ordinary skill in the art” would solve problems or issues
fundamental to patent law.135 In stark contrast to the Court’s earlier description of the Federal Circuit as having an “informed opi129

See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125–26
(2006) (per curiam).
130
Id. at 138 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)).
131
Id.
132
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
133
See id. at 422.
134
Id. at 419.
135
Id. at 418.
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nion on the complex issue of the degree to which the obviousness
determination is one of fact,”136 in KSR the Supreme Court gave
no deference to any purported expertise of the Federal Circuit.137
Rather, the Court described the Federal Circuit’s analysis as “constricted” and as containing “fundamental misunderstandings,”
and it did so unanimously.138
Not satisfied to stop there, the Court also fulfilled the promise
of the dissenters in Laboratory Corp. by reworking the Federal Circuit’s understanding of patentable subject matter in a series of recent cases, starting with Bilski v. Kappos in 2010,139 continuing
through Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc.140 and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc.,141 and culminating in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.142
In the process, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the Federal
Circuit’s care of patent law, going out of its way to declare that
“nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
used in the past.”143
As the Court has attacked the Federal Circuit’s understanding
of the fundamental patent law concepts of patent eligibility and obviousness, it should not be surprising that the Court also gave no
deference to—and chastised the Federal Circuit for its misunderstanding of—some other patent law questions. After the Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the patent exhaustion
doctrine does not apply to method claims in Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Electronics, Inc.,144 the Court stated in its Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc. decision that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to infringe a method patent.”145 The Court also rewrote the standard
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Dennison Mfg. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986).
See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 404, 421–22.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014).
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for determining when something is indefinite in Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., after complaining that the Federal Circuit’s
test had “[f]allen short” of the standard as it was “more amorphous than the statutory definiteness requirement allows.”146
In general, rather than defer to the Federal Circuit’s views
“[f]or many substantive issues of patent law . . . the Court has
dusted off its own venerable case law for guiding principles, largely
ignoring twenty-five years of more recent Federal Circuit decisions.”147 Indeed, even when affirming the Federal Circuit decisions in Bilski and Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s description of the applicable
law, affirming the conclusions by applying patent law in a very different way than the Federal Circuit had.148 Collectively, these cases
demonstrate a pattern: the Supreme Court, itself a generalist court,
has roundly rejected calls for it to defer to the “specialist” Federal
Circuit. While the general view of patent commentators is that
“[i]t is an odd moment indeed when the Supreme Court feels
moved to explain patent infringement to the dedicated patent court
of appeals,”149 it is not odd at all when one takes the position that
there is nothing expert about the “specialist” patent appeals court.
The law applicable to patents, the Court insists, is not just not special, it is also not any more difficult than other areas of law. Accordingly, there is no reason generalist judges cannot understand the
146

Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2131 (2014); see id. at 2124
(“In place of the ‘insolubly ambiguous’ standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention.”); id. at 2130 (“[A]lthough this Court does not
‘micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit’s particular word choice’ in applying patent-law
doctrines, we must ensure that the Federal Circuit’s test is at least ‘probative of the
essential inquiry.’” (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 40 (1997))).
147
Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 30. This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s
resolution of issues of patent law were necessarily correct or the Federal Circuit’s wrong.
As Justice Jackson famously said of the Court: “We are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring). For purposes of this Article, the important point is that in the
Court’s view, it is as qualified as the Federal Circuit to consider patent law issues.
148
See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612; Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754
(2011).
149
Feldman, supra note 39, at 34.
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law just as well as specialist judges, and no reason to defer to the
supposed “expertise” of the Federal Circuit. The Court seems to
be saying that in its opinion, specialist patent judges—who are
“specialists” only in the sense that they are intimately familiar
with the law, as opposed to the underlying facts—are no better at
deciding patent cases than are generalists, and may be worse.150
What the Court has done in its recent foray into patent law is to
proclaim, in strong disagreement with the assertions by patent law
commentators, that a generalist appellate court can competently
understand and apply patent law. To the extent that people think
the Supreme Court itself cannot do patent law, the Court has itself
forcefully asserted, “Yes, we can.”
As Professor Golden has aptly noted, “[T]he Circuit hears
enough patent cases to acquire unquestionable expertise on questions of substantive patent law.”151 The Supreme Court does not
appear to believe the Federal Circuit’s “expertise” in patent law
should be deferred to, however.152 It appears, instead, that the Supreme Court is suggesting that courts who are experts only in the
sense that they are specialists in some area of law are not owed deference based upon that expertise. This view is supported by a recent realization that “these trends are occurring across the entirety
of the Federal Circuit’s decisions, and not just with regards to pa150

At least one of the Justices appear to be of the view, shared by some commentators,
that the biggest beneficiary of the notion that patent law requires special patent law
expertise is the patent bar. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007) (“[The TSM test] produces more patents, which
is what the patent bar gets paid for, to acquire patents, not to get patent applications
denied but to get them granted. And the more you narrow the obviousness standard to
these three imponderable nouns, the more likely it is that the patent will be granted.”); see
also Gugliuzza, supra note 33, at 1855 (“[T]his empirical evidence suggests that the
creation of the Federal Circuit has increased patent activity generally without unduly
favoring either patent holders or accused infringers—an outcome that would seem to
please patent lawyers of all stripes.”).
151
Golden, supra note 70, at 660; see also Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“Clearly, the
Federal Circuit has developed patent expertise of a higher average level than that
previously found in the regional circuits, as a result to deciding over 200 patent appeals
per year.”).
152
The Court’s practice is also inconsistent with the suggestion that the circuits should
defer to the expert Federal Circuit. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the
Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 564–68 (2004).
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tent questions.”153 The Court thus appears to have taken one small
step toward joining those who doubt the specialization of judges
helps judges reach better decisions.154
Jonas Anderson has suggested that the Supreme Court’s involvement in patent law is in reality the Court starting a dialogue
with Congress, using the Federal Circuit as an intermediary.155 If
this is a dialogue with Congress, it may be a shot across the bow
against the use of specialized courts. If so, Congress does not seem
to have gotten the message. After the Court held that the regional
courts of appeals could decide certain patent law issues in Vornado,156 Congress responded by strengthening the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction over patents.157 On the other hand, in response to criticism about the Federal Circuit’s exclusivity in
another area of its jurisprudence, Congress took a step toward dismantling the specialized court regime by undoing the Federal Circuit’s longstanding exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
Whistleblower Protection Act.158 Still, regardless of whether the
Court’s pronouncement extends beyond patent law and the Federal Circuit, at least in this one area, the Court has decided that a
specialist court is owed no more deference than a generalist one.159

153

Daniel Kazhdan, Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship with the
Federal Circuit, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 275 (2012); see also Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1211–12 (2011) (describing an increase in the
Court’s attention to the Federal Circuit’s veteran law jurisprudence).
154
See Ford, supra note 50, at 49 (“[T]his study suggests that specialization does not
improve copyright decisions.”); see also POSNER, supra note 22, at 254 (“In most areas of
federal law at present, there cannot be any assurance that a specialized court, merely by
virtue of specializing, would produce better decisions.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Judging,
Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2012) (“[I]t is unlikely to be
the case that the content of specialists’ decisions will differ in some qualitative respect
from—or be in some general sense ‘better than’—those of their generalist
counterparts.”).
155
J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2014).
156
See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
157
See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 19(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
158
See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong.
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
159
See Anderson, supra note 155, at 1097.
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C. Implications for the Specialized Patent Judiciary
Neither the realization that the law applicable to patents is not
special, nor the recognition that the Court does not defer to the
Federal Circuit, necessarily translates into a recommendation to
undo Congress’s experiments with specialization in this area or
endorsement of proposals to direct patent appeals back to the regional courts of appeal, where they were once decided. While the
Court has, I think correctly, called into question the notion that
patent law expertise is necessary to decide patent cases, it is ultimately an empirical question whether such experience makes any
difference: one that the PPP will help assess. What the Court’s foray into patent law teaches at least is that there are serious questions whether to continue to specialize the judiciary based upon
expertise in patent law until there is reason to believe that doing so
will help.
With respect to the Federal Circuit, it is important to recall that
it was created for reasons other than developing patent law expertise in the judges who hear patent appeals.160 Congress was also—
and even more—interested in uniformity and efficiency, both goals
that are not undermined by the Court’s apparent view that patent
law expertise is not a necessary precondition to deciding patent law
cases.161 The Court’s view that patent law is not exceptional therefore has only limited implication for the future of specialization of
the patent-focused judiciary. Still, policy-makers would be wise to
consider the possibility that the Court is correct that increased legal expertise is not the solution to the judiciary’s patent dilemma,
as they consider structural changes to improve the resolution of
patent cases.
III.

WHAT MAKES SOME PATENT CASES DIFFICULT IS
THE TECHNOLOGY

A. The Technology in Patent Cases Is Often Difficult
Even while the Court has suggested that generalist judges can
apply patent law, the Court has not been sanguine about those
160
161

See Thompson, supra note 152, at 525.
See id. at 525.
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judges’ ability to decide patent cases as a whole. Instead, the Court
has revealed that whereas it believes that patent law is comprehensible by a generalist judiciary, the court recognizes that the facts in
patent cases are another issue entirely. As Judge Rifkind noted in
1951, that is where patent law gets difficult, because it is not the law
that makes patent cases complex, it is the technology.162 The modern Court discovered that fact for itself when it began to regularly
delve into patent cases. In Mayo,163 the Court was forced to consider a case that demanded involvement not only with patent law but
also with the scientific facts to which the law was to be applied.164
Again, the Court gave the Federal Circuit no deference, instead
unanimously reversing the Federal Circuit after conducting its own
analysis of whether the claimed use of thiopurine drugs in the
treatment of autoimmune diseases was a patentable process or an
impermissible attempt to claim a fundamental law of nature.165 But
even while doing so the Court conceded, “Courts and judges are
not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of judgments
needed to distinguish among different laws of nature.”166 To conduct its analysis, the Court relied upon amici it described as medical experts, including the American Medical Association, the
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the American Society of Human Genetics, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Association for Molecular Pathology.167
The Court was again forced to delve into scientific questions it
was not well suited to deal with the following year when assessing
the patentability of DNA and cDNA in Myriad.168 Justice Scalia’s
notable concurrence sums up nicely the concerns of many jurists
when dealing with such questions:
162

See Rifkind, supra note 23, at 425; see also Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60,
at 878 (“[T]he complexity of patent law lies not in its legal principles but in the scientific
fact-finding required to apply those legal principles properly.”).
163
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
164
As the Court stated, it turned to its precedents only to “reinforce[] our conclusion.”
Id. at 1302.
165
See id. at 1289.
166
Id. at 1303.
167
See id.
168
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its
opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the
rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details on my
own knowledge or even my own belief. It suffices for
me to affirm, having studied the opinions below and
the expert briefs presented here, that the portion of
DNA isolated from its natural state sought to be patented is identical to that portion of the DNA in its
natural state; and that complementary DNA
(cDNA) is a synthetic creation not normally present
in nature.169
Through that admission, Justice Scalia joined a long list of eminent jurists who have recognized their own lack of real subject matter expertise to address the complex scientific and technological
questions that sometimes underlie patent cases and have questioned the wisdom of having those questions decided by judges.170
As Felix Frankfurter observed, “It is an old observation that the
training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation.”171 That sentiment was
echoed by Learned Hand, who asked: “How long we shall continue
to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows;
but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits
of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.”172 Judge Friendly, whose clarion call for change led to the
use of specialized courts said that patent cases go “beyond the ability of the usual judge to understand without the expenditure of an
inordinate amount of educational effort . . . and, in many instances,
even with it.”173 While those eminent jurists have been described
as “express[ing] skepticism about the ability of generalist judges to
understand patent disputes,”174 it is fairer to say that the judges
169

Id. at 2020 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See infra notes 171–174 and accompanying text.
171
Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943).
172
Parke–Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
173
HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156–57 (1973); see
generally Friendly, supra note 15.
174
Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 1448.
170
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were expressing skepticism about the ability of judges to understand patent disputes, whether they are generalists or specialists.
The concern is not that judges don’t know enough law; it is that
they don’t know enough science and have difficulty applying the
law to difficult facts.
B. The Federal Circuit Cannot Be Patent Fact-finders
One potential resolution to this problem is for the Court to begin to defer more to the Federal Circuit with respect to the technologies underlying patent disputes. In harmony with Professor
Dreyfuss’ suggestion that “the Federal Circuit’s unique responsibility toward patent law argues for a broader scope of review over
fact finding,” the court could simply choose to defer to that specialist court.175 Congress included no special deference mechanism
when it created the Federal Circuit, however, and the Court has
not chosen to create one. Instead, just as the Court has thus refused to defer to the Federal Circuit’s expertise over the law applicable to patents, so too the Court has found that the Federal Circuit has no special claim to development of the facts. Instead, the
Court has held that the fact-finders, both the PTO and district
court judges, are better equipped than the Federal Circuit to apply
that law to the facts of individual cases.176 The Court first did so in
1999, when it held that the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO decisions should be under the more deferential APA standard rather
than the one the Federal Circuit had been applying.177 More recently, in a pair of 2014 cases, Highmark and Octane Fitness, the Court
required the Federal Circuit to defer more to the district court decisions about whether a case is exceptional.178 The next year, in Teva, the Court overturned decades of Federal Circuit precedent to
limit the Federal Circuit’s review of district courts’ claim construction decisions.179

175

Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 61–62.
See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
177
See id.
178
See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
179
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).
176
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When it comes to questions of fact, the Court has insisted that
if any judge must attempt to resolve difficult technological or scientific factual questions, it is better that it be trial judges rather than
appellate judges. While the Court does not appear to believe in the
development of expertise when it comes to an area of the law, the
Court appears to believe that whatever understanding of the particular scientific issue a district court is able to acquire while dealing with the case is at least better than appellate courts are able to
manage. As the Court said in Teva:
We have previously pointed out that clear error review is “particularly” important where patent law is
at issue because patent law is “a field where so
much depends upon familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained
in the general storehouse of knowledge and experience.” A district court judge who has presided
over, and listened to, the entirety of a proceeding
has a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that
familiarity than an appeals court judge who must
read a written transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties have referred.180
While the Supreme Court has resolved that the Federal Circuit
(as well as the Court itself) should avoid dealing with the facts underlying patent disputes as much as possible and focus on getting
the law right, that solution is unavailable to the district courts.181 As
fact-finders, district court judges are required to delve into the
facts of many patent disputes.182 Accordingly, as best it can within
the current framework, the Court appears to be shifting patent fact
related issues to the court better able to discover such facts. The
Court seems to appreciate that getting the facts of a patent case
right requires more, not less, understanding of the technology involved. While the Federal Circuit has at times asserted an outsize
role in fact-finding in patent cases, and has been encouraged to do

180

Id. at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,
610 (1950)).
181
See id. at 837.
182
See Lee, supra note 69, at 77.

834

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:797

so by commentators who view that court as an expert tribunal,183
the Supreme Court has roundly rejected each of the Federal Circuit’s attempts to “bring its expertise to bear on the facts that affect the outcome of technologically complex cases.”184 Instead, the
Court has shifted those factual issues back to district court judges.
In doing so, the Court does not seem, however, to be giving its
stamp of approval to programs, like the PPP, that aim to develop
patent law expertise in district court judges. If the Federal Circuit
judges are not given deference based upon their very extensive patent law experience, it would be odd indeed to defer to district
court judges who have far less patent law experience on that same
basis. The Court has decided that district courts should have a
greater role in developing the facts of patent law cases not because
the district court judges have patent law experience but because
they have the time, and the ability to employ experts, to try to understand the science at issue in that particular case.185 As Professor
Lee has noted, the Court’s recent decisions “reflect a sentiment
that enhancing accuracy may go hand-in-hand with requiring
courts to engage more fully with technological context.”186
Ultimately, the Supreme Court appears to be unwilling to defer
to lower court judges on issues of patent law (including either the
Federal Circuit or PPP judges) if the specialization reflects only the
development of legal expertise, rather than specialization that in
some way will help those judges to better understand the facts in
patent law cases.187 Because solely having patent law expertise will
not enable judges to decide patent cases any better than generalists,
there is no reason to try to develop that expertise in judges.
C. Judiciary-Based Solutions Are Unlikely to Resolve the Problem
The judiciary’s problem with patent law, in a nutshell, is that
patent fact-finding appears likely to benefit from scientific and
183

See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 61–62.
Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 798.
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See Lee, supra note 69, at 12.
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Id. at 46.
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The Court’s logic is also inconsistent with other proposals to increase the patent
experience of judges as a way to increase their “expertise” in dealing with patent cases.
See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 50, at 788 (“[A]n expected greater volume of patent
cases . . . should cause the CIT to develop appropriate expertise in patent law . . . .”).
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technical expertise but judges, both at the district court and appellate level, currently lack that expertise.188 Having concluded that
the technology is, if anything, what may be special about patent
law, the question becomes how to better deal with those difficult
facts. Despite persistent misconceptions to the contrary, the majority of the judges on the Federal Circuit do not have technical backgrounds, and an even smaller proportion of district court judges
have science or engineering expertise.189 As this Article has detailed, Congress’s attempts to specialize the judiciary, both
through the creation of the Federal Circuit and the PPP, are not
effective solutions to this problem because legal expertise is not
what is needed in patent law, a fact to which the Supreme Court
has recently called attention.190
Various additional proposals have been offered to increase the
expertise of the courts dealing with patent cases. Perhaps the most
straightforward are proposals simply to appoint more scientists and
people with technological expertise to the judiciary. Scott Brewer
proposed to have scientifically or technically trained judges decide
cases at the trial level where scientific or technical facts are at issue.191 Similarly, Professor Kondo suggested that “[t]he Federal
Circuit, or a division of it, might further evolve to become more
specialized in fact in the future through court appointments, approximating a science or patent court.”192 Indeed, multiple researchers have proposed the creation of a patent court at the trial

188

See Kondo, supra note 26, at 7 (“Federal judges and juries, with the notable
exception of the Federal Circuit, generally lack the scientific expertise arguably necessary
to comprehend and decide highly technical intellectual property cases.”). In fact, the
Federal Circuit is no exception. As Professor Kondo acknowledges, only a few Federal
Circuit judges have a technical or scientific background. Id. at 6. Professor Kondo’s
attribution of expertise is based solely upon patent law experience, not scientific
expertise.
189
Of the thirty-eight judges who have ever been appointed to the Federal Circuit, only
nine have technical backgrounds. See supra note 48.
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See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 833 (2015).
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See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1681 (1998).
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Kondo, supra note 26, at 87. Among other predicted benefits, he hypothesizes that
“increased specialization within the judiciary will result in greater comprehension of
technologically complex cases.” Id. at 105.
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level, both with and without judges who have technical expertise.193
Commentators who lament the high district court claim construction reversal rate have frequently hypothesized that judges with
scientific training may be better at claim construction.194 Others
have proposed increasing the training of judges generally, such that
they are prepared for a patent case when one is assigned.195
The problems with each of those proposals largely mirror the
problems applicable to Congress’s previous efforts to specialize the
judiciary. Each of the concerns that were expressed when Congress
created the Federal Circuit are just as applicable to efforts to create
a specialized patent court, including the concerns that the court
will become too insular, will develop tunnel vision, will be too propatent, and will be subject to capture.196 In addition, the Supreme
Court may be wary of those proposals for the same reasons it appears not to have embraced Congress’s patent law specialization
efforts. The proposal for directly appointing more technicallytrained judges to the Federal Circuit, for example, does not take
advantage of the understanding that it is patent fact-finding (as op193

See Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 896; Gregory J. Wallace, Note,
Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A
Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1383, 1410–15 (2004) (proposing to establish a uniform national patent trial court).
194
See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 60, at 196 (“[T]echnical education or prior experience
with patent law may be required.”); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District
Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1731 (2009).
195
See, e.g., Linn, supra note 58, at 737. Similarly, a number of researchers have alluded
to the benefits of increased reliance upon technically trained law clerks. While nobody
appears to have explicitly proposed an entirely clerk-based solution to the problem of
expertise, it has often been noted that the law clerks who serve upon the Federal Circuit,
and its predecessor—the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—usually
have backgrounds in science and technology. See, e.g., Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Jefferson Chem. Co., 497 F.2d 1283, 1284 (2d Cir. 1974) (“This patent appeal is another
illustration of the absurdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made by judges
whose knowledge of the relevant technology derives primarily, or even solely, from
explanations of counsel and who, unlike the judges of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, do not have access to a scientifically knowledgeable staff.”); Dreyfuss, supra
note 67, at 797 (2010) (noting that the Federal Circuit “chooses clerks for their technical
backgrounds and it can hire staff to advise it on technical matters”). The appointment of
law clerks with such expertise is also a central tenet of the PPP. See Issa, supra note 39
(“Each of the test courts will be assigned a clerk with expertise in patent law or the
scientific issues arising in patent cases . . . .”).
196
See supra Section I.A.
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posed to patent law) that requires subject-matter expertise.197 It
also fails to account for the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements that the Federal Circuit, as an appellate court, is not in a position to delve into the facts as much as that court has been
doing.198 In light of that recent jurisprudence limiting the ability of
the Federal Circuit to delve into the technological underpinnings of
patent cases, it seems there is little that a group of scientists on the
Federal Circuit could realistically do to improve the adjudication of
patent disputes.
Another reason that simply creating an appellate court made up
of scientists may not be sufficient to resolve the problem was well
described by Judge Rifkind. As he noted, “It is hardly to be supposed that the members of a patent court will be so omniscient as
to possess specialized skill in chemistry, in electronics, mechanics
and in vast fields of discovery as yet uncharted.”199 That realization
is as true of the Federal Circuit as it is a hypothetical patent court,
and a concern with the majority of the proposals to inject more expertise into the judiciary. Professor Arti Rai appropriately criticized
Professor Brewer’s suggestion “because expertise in one area of
science or technology does not transfer over to other areas,” it
“would require selecting a group of judges that was trained in a
large variety of different areas of science and technology.”200 Professor Rai also criticized the Federal Circuit on that basis.201 Her
proposal to create a specialized trial court is not, however, immune
from that same problem, as she proposes that the judges on a specialized patent trial court would have only a minimal level of familiarity with scientific principles rather than subject-matter expertise
pertinent to the technology being considered.202 Such a proposal
seems insufficient in light of a recent study providing preliminary
evidence supporting the view that the particular type of scientific
or technical expertise that a Federal Circuit judge enjoys makes a
difference in how that particular judge decides patent cases in that
field. As the study’s author notes, “expertise in one technical field
197
198
199
200
201
202

See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
Rifkind, supra note 23, at 426.
Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 894.
See id.
See id. at 894.
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does not connote expertise in all technical fields.”203 Ultimately,
proposals to create a patent court made up of judges who do not
have scientific or technical expertise rely upon the notion that the
judges will develop expertise through repeated exposure to patent
cases. As this article suggests, however, expertise in patent law
may not be what is needed in patent cases.
Jeanne Fromer suggests that geography might solve the expertise problem, as different technologies are over-represented in different parts of the country.204 She hypothesizes that if venue rules
were changed to require patent litigation to stay close to home, it
will result in repeated judicial exposure to the same type of technology, which will improve a judge’s ability to consider patent cases dealing with that technology.205 Unfortunately, that proposal
depends upon the as yet unproven theory that judges can develop
sufficient scientific or technical expertise through repeated exposure to cases involving a particular type of technology, rather than
through formal technical education.206 While that may be true, it
does not bode well for the litigants whose cases are the ones in
which the judge is learning the technology. Moreover, as Judge
Friendly lamented, many patent cases are often beyond the ability
of a judge to understand even after the judge has devoted “the expenditure of an inordinate amount of educational effort.”207 The
concern about the amount of training that it may take to educate a
judge about the science underlying a particular patent case raises
what may be an intractable problem with each of the proposals to
inject expertise into patent cases by increasing the scientific acumen of the judiciary. At the end of the day, judges are not scientists, and perhaps we don’t want them to be. Perhaps we want
them to focus their efforts instead toward being experts in judging.
Ultimately, judges are already specialists, and their field is the
law. In his excellent article written shortly after the creation of the
203

Charlie Stiernberg, Science, Patent Law, and Epistemic Legitimacy: An Empirical Study
of Technically Trained Federal Circuit Judges, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 279, 290 (2013).
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See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1490 (2010).
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Federal Circuit, Judge Richard Posner identifies the fact that in the
traditional American system “[o]ur judges are specialized―to
judging.”208 In a footnote he continues: “And, it goes without saying, to the law.”209 I am not so sure it should go without saying.
Perhaps it is better to explicitly proclaim that judges are specialists
in the law if only to acknowledge that there is such a specialty. It
seems likely that for one to truly become a “specialist” in the law,
it helps if one is a generalist with respect to the facts to which that
law is to be applied. In other words, it may be that judges can be
better judges if we do not ask them also to be specialists in some
other skill, or some other area of inquiry. It hardly seems that we
will get those individuals who have best learned the specialty of
judging if we are also asking them to become experts in biochemistry or particle physics.
The Supreme Court appears to be sympathetic to such notions.
As this Article has demonstrated, in recent years the Court has deemphasized the importance of specializing in patent law while also
recognizing that judges are ill-equipped to address scientific questions.210 Combining those teachings does not suggest that judges
should learn more science, but that they should focus upon their
judicial role. As at least some justices have directly cautioned,
judges should not aspire to become “amateur scientists.”211 An
additional concern with judges being asked to develop technical
expertise is that it may not be good policy to give experts, or judges
turned experts, the last word on scientific or technical issues, as
experts are invariably partisan. As Professsor Rai has aptly noted,
“In areas of heated scientific controversy, all individuals who are
sufficiently knowledgeable to qualify as experts may have already
committed themselves to one or the other side of a dispute.”212 Es208

Posner, supra note 34, at 778.
Id. at 778 n.44; see also Plager, supra note 23, at 858 (“Lawyers who become judges
become specialists in judging, regardless of the breadth of cases confronted.”); Wood,
supra note 11, at 1768 (“[J]udges themselves are specialists in ‘judging.’”).
210
See supra Sections II.B, III.A.
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See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1993) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 599 (recognizing that “definitions of scientific knowledge,
scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review” are “matters far afield from the
expertise of judges”).
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Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 893; see also Posner, supra note 34, at
782 (“I doubt that patent law, where there is a deep cleavage, paralleling the cleavages in
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pecially in patent law, which by definition involves new and nonobvious discoveries,213 it may be particularly important to ensure that
someone who is blessedly unbiased about the underlying science or
technology will serve as the final authority about those issues. The
judiciary is comprised of exactly those people, experts at judging
who are often ignorant of the more subtle nuances of various areas
of science.
Perhaps sensitive to these concerns, some researchers have
proposed solutions that do not directly involve the Article III judiciary. For example, Edward DiLello has proposed the creation of
permanent expert magistrate judges,214 while Eric Cheng has proposed shifting more patent cases to the International Trade Commission (“ITC”).215 While those proposals avoid some of the problems associated with an expert judiciary, they may ultimately prove
to be unworkable because they are too difficult to implement or involve too great a departure from the status quo for Congress to seriously consider making the necessary changes. Both proposals suffer from the same problem as the proposal to create a patent trial
court. As Professor Rai noted, to solve that particular problem
would require “a trial court with at least as many specialties and
subspecialties as the Patent and Trademark Office.”216 To solve
the expertise problem with magistrate judges would also require
the appointment of magistrates with different specialties in each
district, as the type of expertise one magistrate judge has may not
be transferable to different cases outside that magistrate’s expertise. Professor Rai lamented that “the likelihood of assembling a
group of judges competent not only in law but in all of the various

antitrust law, between those who believe that patent protection should be construed
generously to create essential incentives to technological progress and those who believe
that patent protection should be narrowly construed to accommodate the procompetitive
policies of the antitrust laws, is such an area . . . .”).
213
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012).
214
See Edward V. Di Lello, Fighting Fire With Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at
the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 499 (1993) (proposing the creation of permanent
expert magistrate judges).
215
See Eric B. Cheng, Alternatives to District Court Patent Litigation: Reform by
Enhancing the Existing Administrative Options, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1135, 1162 (2010).
216
Rai, Specialized Trial Courts, supra note 60, at 894.
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fields of scientific and technical endeavor relevant to the patent
system is low.”217
Another solution, outside the judiciary has also been discussed.
Professor Dreyfuss considered the problem not only by analogy to
the PTO, but having the PTO itself provide the necessary expertise
to the patent system.218 She recognized that “administrative factfinding might be preferable to specialized trials,” and that “the
scope of re-examination could be expanded to allow the PTO to
reinvestigate whether a patent was properly issued.”219 She did not
believe, however, that the PTO was up to the task.220 But while it
may have been a low probability, Congress has crafted a solution
that takes advantage of many of the strengths of these proposals by
creating the new PTAB within the PTO. As the next Part explores,
that entity avoids many of the pitfalls of prior proposals for dealing
with the difficulties of patent cases.
THE PTAB: A SOLUTION INVOLVING SPECIALIZED
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE
When Congress most recently reformed the patent system,
through passage of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), it continued
the movement toward specialization of patent law that began with
the creation of the Federal Circuit.221 The newest effort is unlike
the previous reforms, however, as in the AIA, Congress did not
attempt to specialize the courts or rely solely upon the notion that
legal expertise is developed through experience.222 Instead, this
newest specialization effort responds well to the reality that the difficult portion of a patent case is the technology, and finds the necessary expertise to deal with that technology in a judge’s formal
IV.
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education.223 Rather than specialize the judiciary, Congress’s most
recent specialization to patent law resulted in more patent disputes
being shifted to an entity within the executive branch with real subject-matter expertise, the PTAB.224
A. Specialized Expertise to Address Complex Technology
The PTAB is currently composed of approximately 230 Administrative Patent Judges (“APJ”) appointed by the Secretary of
Commerce.225 Unlike most judges in the federal judiciary, each of
those APJs has technical or scientific backgrounds as well as a law
degree. Moreover, each of the APJs is hired to handle trials involving a particular type of technology. The qualifications for one recent job posting for a PTAB-APJ, stated that to be considered for
the position applicants must possess, in addition to a law degree
and experience with patent law, “a bachelor’s or higher degree in
the study of engineering, chemistry, or biology” or “[a] thorough
knowledge of the physical and mathematical sciences underlying
professional engineering” and “[a] good understanding, both theoretical and practical, of the engineering sciences and techniques
and their application to professional engineering.”226 Whereas
creating “a trial court with at least as many specialties and subspecialties as the Patent and Trademark Office”227 may have been impossible within the judiciary, that is precisely what Congress
created in the PTAB within the PTO itself. Accordingly, when an
issue is considered by the PTAB, the people discussing the issue on
both sides of the bench are likely to have some expertise in the
technology at issue as well as familiarity with the patent laws.
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While the notion of the development of technical expertise is
fairly new to the judiciary, the PTO has long held the view that
technical knowledge is necessary to apply patent law to new technologies. Therefore, only registered patent attorneys or agents may
practice before the PTO.228 To become a registered patent attorney
or agent, one must both have a particular technical or scientific
background as well as pass the “Patent Bar,” the PTO’s “registration examination.”229 For its part, the PTO also requires that patent examiners have some specialized technical expertise.230 Unlike
the historically generalist court system, the internal workings of the
PTO are highly specialized with examiners working within a particular “art unit.” Those distinctive aspects of the PTO are all
maintained for the PTAB.
The use of the PTAB to resolve patent issues therefore comports with commentators’ views that patent cases may benefit from
increased specialization. Because Congress’s effort has resulted in
the appointment of subject-matter experts as patent judges, it fulfills the goals of commentators who proposed solutions such as the
creation of a patent court.231 While the use of technically expert
judges is yet a further specialization of patent law, it is quite different from the specialization of the courts and judges that Congress
previously attempted, as it is not an effort to make the law special
or to create legal expertise through experience, but rather, it is a
reaction to the reality that dealing with cutting edge technology is
what is special about patent cases. Thus, the PTAB also avoids
many of the objections to Congress’s earlier specialization efforts
detailed above. The use of an executive agency, rather than the judiciary, to apply patent laws to the technically difficult subject matter of patents addresses many of the concerns of commentators and
the Supreme Court. By making an executive agency fulfill that role,
the courts remain free to complete the role the Supreme Court envisions, that of unbiased non-experts in technical matters.
The PTAB does not address all of the issues involving technology that may arise in patent cases, however. Instead Congress li228
229
230
231
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See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2.
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mited its role to one of addressing issues of a patent’s validity. The
first major role played by the PTAB is to serve as an appellate
body, giving patent applicants an opportunity to obtain a second
opinion from the PTO about a patent examiner’s decision to deny a
patent application. The PTAB’s other major role is to conduct adjudications and issue decisions in two types of proceedings created
by the AIA: Post-Grant Review (“PGR”) and Inter Partes Review
(“IPR”).232 The PGR procedure allows someone other than the
patent owner to challenge the validity of a patent within nine
months after the patent has been issued.233 The IPR procedure is
similar except that the person challenging the patent as invalid may
only file the challenge after a PGR has been completed or the time
period for filing a PGR has elapsed.234 The issues the administrative law judges who make up the PTAB may consider are also different between the two proceedings. During a PGR, the PTAB may
invalidate a patent based upon any ground that could be raised during a patent infringement trial, whereas during an IPR a patent can
be invalidated only if it is not novel, is obvious, or both.235 Those
post-grant proceedings are adversarial in nature, and much like a
district court trial, involve discovery and oral argument. They differ from district court trial proceedings, however, in that PTAB
decisions are made by a panel of three judges, as opposed to the
district court model, which involves a single judge. Importantly,
decisions of the PTAB as to a patent’s validity have preclusive effect on the party that raises a post-grant challenge, as the petitioner
is subject to estoppel in district court. Specifically, once the PTAB
issues a final written decision, the petitioner may not assert in any
civil action “that the claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during” the proceed232

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 311–29 (2012). The PTAB is also responsible for conducting
proceedings specifically related to challenges to “covered business methods,” a provision
scheduled to expire in 2020. See Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329–30 (2011).
233
See 35 U.S.C. § 321.
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Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) and (3)), with 35
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ing.236 The PTAB’s decision does not, however, estop parties who
are not party to the PTAB proceeding. The PTAB also does not
address issues of infringement, which continue to be addressed by
district court judges and juries.
B. A Proposal to Expand the Role of the PTAB
By creating the PTAB, and implementing an administrative
system to allow for post-grant review of patents, Congress has
achieved multiple benefits that commentators previously touted
from such a procedure, including cost savings and increased efficiency versus district court proceedings.237 One very tangible difference is that by statute, PTAB must resolve disputes significantly
faster than the normal time it takes to complete district court proceedings.238 In addition, as this Article describes, the PTAB adds a
level of expertise that is often absent from district courts proceedings.239 Indeed, the potential benefits of expert agency adjudication
of patent law issues are so great, that one might think that it makes
sense to ask the executive to decide all issues in patent cases; both
validity and infringement, and to exclude the courts entirely. Under current law, district court judges continue to decide, in addition to questions of infringement, whether a patent is valid in the
first place.240 A district court is called upon to evaluate patent validity both when a validity defense is raised in a patent infringement
suit as well as when an unsuccessful patent applicant sues the PTO
in district court directly to obtain a patent.241 In either procedural
posture, a district judge must decide patent validity questions that,
as this Article has outlined, the PTAB may be in a better position
to address.242 As a result, there are inefficiencies in the current system, not the least of which is that litigants prepare for the infringement portion of litigation even while the validity of a patent is
236
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uncertain. Against this backdrop, it is worth considering whether
some expansion of the PTAB’s role is advisable. Ultimately, I do
not advocate quite such an extreme proposal as removing all patent
cases from district courts. In my estimation, the PTO could not be
authorized to decide cases of alleged patent infringement. On the
other hand, expanding the role of the PTAB to address all validity
issues—while removing those issues from the courts—is a path
forward that has substantial advantages.
Rather than employing the PTAB’s expertise to resolve only
some portion of validity disputes, one possible solution to the current problem of forcing unequipped district courts to decide patent
validity issues is to employ the PTAB’s expertise in all circumstances in which patent validity questions arise. Under current law,
the PTAB is merely an alternative forum for deciding questions of
patent validity.243 My solution would involve making the PTAB the
exclusive forum for raising those questions. Under my proposed
structure, the PTAB would address validity questions not only
when a party seeks to invoke that forum, but also whenever a patent is asserted in any civil suit and a defendant questions its validity. That could be accomplished either by instituting a system by
which district court judges refer validity questions to the PTAB or
by requiring a party to raise validity challenges at the PTAB shortly
after an infringement suit is filed. Under this proposal, the courts
therefore would deal only with issues of infringement.244
The reason it is possible to shift only determinations of a patent’s validity to the PTAB, as opposed to questions of whether a
patent is infringed, is because of the fundamental difference between questions of infringement and validity. As the Supreme
Court long ago held, patent infringement is a tort.245 Like other
torts, patent infringement involves a civil suit, which, accordingly,
must be decided by Article III courts with access to a jury under the

243

See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).
This proposal would be a case of convergent evolution, as in the German patent
system issues of validity are determined by technical courts whereas issues of
infringement are handled by generalists. See M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent
Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 334 (2006).
245
See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 169 (1894).
244
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Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.246 The same is not true
of questions about a patent’s validity. Rather, the issue of a patent’s validity is an issue between the federal government and the
potential patentee, and as such it is a public right.247 When the federal government grants a patent, the government grants “a bundle
of rights,” including the right to exclude others from using the
claimed invention.248 Congress grants that monopoly pursuant to
its constitutional authority under the Patent Clause.249 Because the
patent rights are created by Congress, they fall within the “public
rights” exception to Article III of the Constitution.250 They may
therefore be decided outside the judicial context.251 In other words,
they may be decided outside of the courts created under Article III
of the Constitution, and without a jury.252
Of course, just because it is constitutionally permissible to
transfer authority for deciding patent validity questions from the
courts to an administrative entity does not mean that course of action should necessarily be followed. Still, there is reason to think
that doing so might be an improvement upon the status quo. Although under this proposal, patent infringement determinations
would still be made by district courts, assigning validity determina246

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376–77 (1996); see also
Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 795 (2001) (“[W]hy do U.S. courts allow juries to decide
patent cases? Because the U.S. Constitution, in its Bill of Rights, requires it.”).
247
See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
248
See Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
249
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
250
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 n.5 (1964) (“Patent rights
exist only by virtue of statute.”); Michael P. Goodman, Taking Back Takings Claims: Why
Congress Giving Just Compensation Jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims Is
Unconstitutional, 60 VILL. L. REV. 83, 98–101 (2015) (describing the public rights category
as one of the exceptions to Article III).
251
See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430
U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may
assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be
incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to
be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law.’ . . . This is the case even if the Seventh
Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned
instead to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”).
252
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612–13 (2011); see also Mark A. Lemley, Why
Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1722 (2013).

848

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:797

tions exclusively to the PTAB effectively fills a gap in the courts’
ability to decide some of the most difficult issues in patent cases.253
The Supreme Court has most lamented the judiciary’s lack of expertise not in dealing with whether a patent is infringed, but in deciding whether it is valid. From the Court’s perspective, “it is often more difficult to determine whether a patent is valid than
whether it has been infringed.”254 Accordingly, permitting the executive PTAB to decide validity issues has the benefit of removing
from the judiciary to the executive only the type of work that most
likely requires subject matter expertise. By limiting the PTAB’s
jurisdiction to issues of patent validity, Congress has already successfully thread the needle to account for the apparent need for
more subject-matter expertise in dealing with patents while also
maintaining the generalist ideals of the judiciary by separating the
most difficult of the technological questions from the judges.
There are a number of reasons why making the PTAB the exclusive forum for addressing patent validity makes sense. As Professor Stuart Benjamin and Professor Rai, among others, have explained, the cost and efficiency benefits that are achieved by a system of post-grant review are maximized when trial court litigation
on patents that survive examination is minimized.255 As those professors also note, however, when that result is achieved through
estoppel-based approaches, like those applicable to PTAB proceedings under the current framework, there is a disincentive for someone to challenge the validity of a patent at the PTAB.256 If that challenge is unsuccessful, that party, and only that party, is barred from
raising validity challenges in an infringement case.257 In addition,
that procedure is inefficient because the unsuccessful challenge
that resulted in a finding of patent validity only prevents another
validity challenge by the same party, but does not prevent future
challenges in district court by other parties.258 Professors Benjamin
and Rai suggest that these inefficiencies can be mitigated by requir253

See supra Section IV.A.
Commil USA, LLC v. Cicso Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015) (quoting Cardinal
Chem. Co. v Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 99 (1993)).
255
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 323.
256
See id. at 324.
257
See id.
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ing courts to give strong Chevron deference to the agency’s postgrant validity determinations.259 As they note, the effect of that increased deference would be that all parties potentially affected by a
patent would feel the effects of the PTAB’s decisions, “that all potential infringers would have an incentive to help the administrative opponent” and that the deference would “presumably lead to
diminished litigation over these patents.”260 Those beneficial effects would be amplified if the PTAB were the exclusive forum for
raising validity questions. All potential infringers have an even
stronger incentive to intervene at the PTAB. In addition, rather
than only a presumption of reduced litigation, there would necessarily be a reduction. From a district court’s perspective, the effect
of making the PTAB the exclusive forum for challenging patent
validity is that the current statutory mandate to presume the validity of the patents at issue would change from a presumption to an
absolute rule. Before a district court spent valuable time deciding
whether a patent was infringed, the patent’s claims would have already been judged to be valid, as the PTAB’s determination of validity, after any associated appeal to the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court, would be the final say on the matter.261 While a party
that is not estopped by a validity decision of the PTAB could, of
course, ask the PTAB to again consider that patent’s validity, because those proceedings are cheaper and faster than district court
proceedings, even duplicative challenges at the PTAB would be
more efficient than the current system.262
Another benefit of PTAB adjudication is that when its decisions are reviewed, including by the Supreme Court, the decisions
are likely to, and should, be afforded considerable deference. While
commentators have recognized that the courts historically lack de259
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 326–27. They are joined in this proscription
by multiple commentators. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent
Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 50 (2007) (“[D]ecisions made as part
of that more intense review should be accorded deference by later decision-makers.”);
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 266 (2015)
(“[C]ourts can—and should—follow the practice of finding the PTO’s and ITC’s
determinations persuasive, even if not technically binding.”).
260
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 326–27.
261
See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012).
262
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 325.
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ference to the PTO, that fact has largely been attributed to the perceived lack of patent experience, technical expertise, or time that
patent examiners can apply to reviewing applications.263 The patent examiners were thought to make errors because of a perceived
asymmetry between the knowledge of the patent examiner and the
patent applicant.264 The same criticisms do not appear to have been
lodged against the PTAB, and likely will not be, at least to the same
extent. Far from the “abbreviated proceedings”265 that take place
during patent examination, the PTAB conducts trial-type proceedings before it issues decisions.266 The PTAB also sits in three-judge
panels in an effort to maintain a high quality of decisions. Finally,
as commentators have noted when surveying the qualifications of
the ALJs generally “the USPTO is delivering on its goal of recruiting administrative patent judges with strong technical backgrounds
and extensive experience practicing patent law.”267 Accordingly,
within the current or expanded framework, the PTAB’s decisions
about a patent’s validity should garner substantial deference in the
courts.
With respect to the Supreme Court, patent people have been
very vocal that the Supreme Court’s involvement in patent law is
not helping. As Judge Dyk has related: “At any gathering of the
[patent] bar, no tag line of a speech has more assurance of applause
than one that importunes the Supreme Court to keep its hands off

263

See Joshua L. Sohn, Can’t the PTO Get a Little Respect?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1603, 1631 (2011) (collecting and describing criticisms of the PTO).
264
See Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 66–67; see also Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 101, 114–38 (2016).
265
Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 146 (2000); see also Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
266
For a detailed description of PTAB procedures, see Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter
Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review, and Post-Grant Review Before the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 10 (2014).
267
JENNIFER R. BUSH, FENWICK & WEST LLP, ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES: NOT
YOUR TYPICAL FEDERAL JUDGE 2 (2014), https://www.fenwick.com/Fenwick
Documents/Administrative_Patent_Judges.pdf [https://perma.cc/EAX8-UPD7] (last
visited Feb. 16, 2016); see also Michael Wagner, An Introduction to Administrative Patent
Judges at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 62 FED. LAW., May 2015, at 36 (“With this
broad amount of experience, the PTAB provides a well-rounded perspective and
expertise in the area of patent law.”).
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the patent law.”268 If, as some have proposed, the Supreme Court
is likely “to bungle the law in a highly technical field such as patent
law” then shifting more of the work related to patents to the PTAB
may achieve the desirable outcome of increased “neglect by the
Court.”269 The Supreme Court is likely to defer to the PTAB’s factual judgment in a way it has not been willing to defer to the Federal Circuit’s legal judgment. While district courts and the Federal
Circuit have generally not afforded the PTO deference in the past,
the Court has expressed a willingness to respect and defer to the
judgment of the PTO that it has not shown subsidiary courts.270
The Court has also recently referred to the PTO as “an expert
agency” with “special expertise in evaluating patent applications.”271
In that way, the PTO, and the PTAB, is no different from the
various other administrative agencies whose expertise is given substantial deference by the courts. Just as Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) decisions about acceptable pollutant levels are
reviewable by courts only to ensure that those decisions are not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion—the APA’s standard272—the PTO’s decisions about a patent’s validity should be
afforded great deference upon review. Indeed, while this discussion
has assumed that the Court is correct that there is something special about the subject matter underlying patent cases, that may be
true only because patent disputes are one of the few categories of
cases in which courts are required to do a more searching review of
agency fact finding than that required by the APA.273 Indeed, the
science or technology involved in EPA decisions is often just as difficult to grasp as in patent cases. In actual fact, there may be noth268

Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 763
(2008); see also Gene Quinn, Naked Emperors: A Supreme Court Patent Tale,
IPWATCHDOG (May 31, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/31/nakedemperors-a-supreme-court-patent-tale/id=58110/
[https://perma.cc/4TUC-BAUN]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (“The idea that the Supreme Court is at all capable of
understanding—let alone deciding—issues of a technical nature is ridiculous.”).
269
Duffy, supra note 72, at 276.
270
See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
271
Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1700 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct.
2238, 2252 (2011).
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See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 283.
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See id. at 285.
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ing special about patent cases except that courts have heretofore
been given an overly large role in resolving them. Shifting some of
this burden to the executive may lead to the realization that there
really isn’t anything special about patent cases.
Perhaps the most important benefit of having an executive entity decide questions of validity, while the courts continue to decide
questions of patent infringement, derives from the unique status
patent validity questions have in our society. As previously noted,
unlike disputes about whether a patent has been infringed, patent
validity issues involve public rights.274 That means that unlike
questions involving infringement, a validity challenge is a complaint about government conduct. Whereas questions of infringement are private disputes that are largely irrelevant to most Americans, issues related to a patent’s validity are question of concern to
many, and are properly thought of as public, rather than private,
law.275 Because a patent grant is a monopoly issued from the government, a patent’s validity raises issues of public policy and is of
legitimate interest to members of the public, including many who
may be uninvolved in any particular infringement suit. In the litigation context, those members of the public can rarely, if ever, have
their voices heard. Still, the importance of patent validity issues has
increasingly resulted in special interest groups trying to get more
involved. Indeed, along with the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law, special interest groups and the public at large have increasingly been interested in patent law because of the importance of
the grant of a patent to society and not only to the litigating parties.
In Myriad, for example, forty-nine different groups filed amicus
briefs to express their views about the patentability of DNA, including the American Medical Association and the AARP,276 and
an incredible sixty-six amicus briefs were filed in Bilski.277 Because
anyone who is not the owner of the patent may challenge a patent’s
274

See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 41–42
(2012).
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validity at the PTAB, special interest groups are now able to get
involved in a more significant way than they could before passage
of the AIA.278 And that is a good thing. The involvement by such
groups will likely have the effect of ensuring that the PTAB is responsive to the policies underlying the patent laws, in a way that
courts, including the Federal Circuit, were not, and could not be.279
While “allowing parties who would not satisfy federal standing requirements to challenge a patent’s validity and raise novel and unsettled legal questions through the post-grant review process” has
been described as an “unintended consequence” of the AIA, it
provides an important opportunity to involve the public in those
issues of patent law that affect the public generally.280 Whereas it is
inappropriate for courts to decide individual disputes about infringement based upon issues of public policy, administrative agencies are specifically tasked with the role of accounting for public
policy as they fill gaps in legislation.281 It is therefore altogether appropriate that issues of validity be decided by the PTO’s PTAB.
CONCLUSION
The law applicable to patent cases is not especially difficult. Rather, the technology underlying patent cases is often what gives the
judiciary trouble. Accordingly, Congress’s efforts to develop specialized legal expertise in the judiciary may have been misguided. A
better solution to deal with what ails the judiciary about patent disputes is to focus expertise toward addressing the underlying technology. Congress’s latest experiment in specializing the patent bo278

See 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) (2012). They do not, however, necessarily have standing to
appeal the PTAB’s determinations to the Federal Circuit. See Consumer Watchdog v.
Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 1401 (2015).
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280
Lorang, supra note 238, at 16.
281
See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 237, at 280.

854

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:797

dies, the creation of the PTAB, employs specialization at the administrative, rather than the judicial, level and appears to be a viable solution to the judiciary’s problem with patent cases. By giving
that agency jurisdiction to decide some of the thorniest issues in
patent cases, questions about patent validity, Congress has made
real progress in this area. The PTAB experiment does not yet go
far enough, however. To more fully capture the benefit of administrative expertise, Congress should consider expanding the PTAB’s
jurisdiction to make it the exclusive forum for challenging the validity of issued patents.

